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‘Is it Safe for Me to Fly’ seems like a simple question. But who is Me, what is Safe,
and why is there a reason for focusing on Fly? Is the underlying question: ‘Are the
people responsible doing everything they should to make flying safe?’ Good
questions – so what are the answers?
First, let us put some limits on the questions. The questions are about somebody
flying as a passenger, not as a pilot or other aircrew. Next, restrict the flights to
ordinary operations between airports. This takes out things like adventure aviation
and tourism sightseeing, eg around mountains, where the risks might well be higher
than for ordinary flights. Third, do not include security aspects – obviously a real
problem, but involving different kinds of decision process.
Some people would never even think that the flying safety questions were sensible
ones to ask. A sizable proportion of people have some kind of phobia, with intense,
persistent fear of something, often with unpleasant physical symptoms. Fear in itself
is not necessarily an irrational response – sensible mice are fearful of cats. A typical
psychologist or psychiatrist would say that the fear shown in phobia, as distinct from
a superstition or aversion, is a panic or anxiety disorder, the product of unnatural or
illogical functioning of the brain. Social phobias are fears about social situations, eg
giving a talk. Specific phobias are fears of a single specific thing, eg spiders, heights.
At the top of the list is agoraphobia, where somebody fears leaving home or their
personal haven.
Fear of flying is sufficiently widespread to justify world conferences. The 3rd
International Conference on Fear of Flying was held under the auspices of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 2007
[http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/meetings/2007/ff07/Documentation.htm], with several
dozen contributors. Bor & Foreman, and de Zeeuw & van Gerwen are interesting
summary presentations. The latter suggest that about a third of the population feels
some kind of anxiety about air travel. Perhaps the main reason that air travel affects
so many people is that it ticks so many different phobia boxes: heights, enclosure,
crowds, death, lack of control, etc. There are many different kinds of therapeutic
treatment for fear of flying, usually involving some combination of education,
exposure and desensitisation. These try to help people get into an appropriate
emotional state. But showing people tables of comparative accident statistics and
trends does not appear to be a major component in resolving the problem.
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going into definitions yet, safe means not suffering damage from being an aircraft
passenger: neither death nor injury. Absolute safety is not possible in an imperfect
world. Safety has to refer to some high, but achievable level of performance, ie the
risks of death/injury are very small. This leads to targets for safety performance
which have words such as acceptable and tolerable attached to them. The
arguments then focus are what are reasonable – but challenging – targets for safety.
Society’s attitudes to safety play a big part in assessing what is acceptably safe. But
aviation safety culture has changed, because society’s safety culture generally has
changed dramatically. Biographies of the Wright Brothers tell us that the first
passenger death was in 1908: Thomas Selfridge, the heaviest passenger so far
carried. Orville Wright was the pilot, crash investigator (the cause was a stress crack
in the propeller), and aircraft designer. It was a test flight for the USA’s Army. There
does not appear to have been an accident investigation or government inquiry.
The first airliner mid-air collision was in 1922, with seven people dead. It happened
in Beauvais, north of Paris. The aircraft were on the London-Paris route flying
towards each other in bad weather – and following the various roads and rail lines
too accurately. But the point to note is that in Flight magazine – the widely read UK
aviation magazine – the accident report was only a few paragraphs at the bottom of
page 7. Today, there would be massive media coverage, and some combination of
public inquiry and thorough accident investigation, eg see the UK Air Accidents
Investigation Branch (AAIB) reports at http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/home/index.cfm.
The growth of air transport as an ordinary transport mode for travellers has been
dramatic. Figure 1 shows ICAO data from 1950 to 2006. The Figure also shows that
passengers also tend to fly longer distances: a revenue passenger-kilometre (RPK)
means a paying passenger flies one kilometre. Historically, RPKs have been
doubling about every eight years – although the current oil price shock makes
continued growth less likely.
In the context of this huge increase in traffic, what has been the safety record?
Figure 2 is from Aviation Safety Network statistics and covers the same period as
Figure 1. This chart shows deaths of aircrew or passengers. The average number of
deaths a year is about 1,200. The number per year is roughly constant over the
whole period – compare the growth illustrated in Figure 1. In general, aviation safety
uses deaths as the indicator of safety, rather than some combination of deaths,
serious injuries and other injuries, probably because of the inherent difficulty of
weighting injuries and deaths. The survivability of an air crash is very dependent on
its circumstances, eg if it is over water or involves fire. Many aviation safety
initiatives are concerned with improving survivability. For example, see the 2001
NTSB report and the AAIB report on the1985 Manchester takeoff accident crash, with
its fire, smoke and evacuation problems – which led to a major Cranfield University
research programmes.
Aviation safety improvements are the product of extremely good ideas about what to
do, but the main ingredient is a massive amount of operational learning and hard
grind in getting things to work. Figure 3 sketches some of the key safety components
of the current aviation system. All of the technologies and warning systems on the
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safety defences in Figure 3 has used both top-down approaches – ie to try to ‘design
out’ risks – and bottom-up learning – ie to try to prevent a similar future accident.
For example, an aircraft taking off from Heathrow crashed in Staines in 1972, killing
all of its 118 passengers and crew. The AAIB found that, during the climb, the lift
devices on the aircraft wings had been set incorrectly, which led to an irrecoverable
deep stall. The lead pilot had undiagnosed coronary artery disease, with evidence of
a possible silent heart attack. The analysis of the accident produced
recommendations about aircraft operating procedures, crew training, cockpit
resource management (ie ensuring that the pilots worked effectively together),
cockpit voice recording (to aid post-crash investigations), and more detailed medical
examination arrangements. All of these led to changes, and these are now
embedded in the structures sketched in Figure 3.
More recent aviation accidents provide new kinds of insight, in particular about
organisational and policy issues. On 1st July 2002, two aircraft collided over
Überlingen on Lake Constance, and all 71 people on the aircraft died. In system
safety terms, the Überlingen tragedy was a very complex accident, with accident
investigators and researchers identifying a large variety of significant causal factors,
including policy on the use of collision avoidance equipment, air traffic control centre
staffing arrangements, the risks posed by engineering work, etc.
Do the world statistics on aviation safety paint the full picture? No, they do not.
Table 1, using International Air Transport Association (IATA) data, presents statistics
on aircraft hull losses in the world’s regions as a rate per million flights. A hull loss
means the aircraft was totally destroyed or damaged beyond economic repair, so it is
a sensible indicator of aircraft operators’ safety performance in the different regions.
(It has limitations as an accident severity metric, as an ageing world fleet and the
economics of repairs could tend to mean that less severe accidents become hull
losses.) The first point to stress is that these rates derive from a statistically small
number of events, the rates for the individual regions typically being based on no
more than three or four accidents. Assuming something like a Poisson distribution of
the number per year, there will be large variations in the rate for each region from
year to year. Second, there are strong indications that the rate for Africa is markedly
higher than the average: note the numbers in bold italic font, which are those that are
more than twice the world average in that year. Improving the safety of operations in
Africa is a high priority for IATA, ICAO and other safety organisations.
So, the world safety record shows major improvements over the years, and Europe’s
record is better than the world average. But suppose the Me of the original question
is from the UK/Great Britain. Obviously, UK/GB is part of Europe’s safety record, but
how does aviation compare with other transport modes? Table 2 is a reduced
version of the DfT’s latest ‘Modal comparisons’ statistics (from its Table 1.7). It
shows that, over a ten-year period, air transport has a better record than other
modes. But there is a danger of hubris here – one bad aviation accident would
change the statistical picture markedly – so the sensible conclusion must be that air
transport is about as safe as rail and bus/coach travel, measured on a passenger
kilometres basis.
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basis, generally have a worse GB safety record than air, rail and bus/coach. The
bottom part of Table 2 shows the comparable car and motorcycle statistics: worse for
cars and much worse for motorcycles. Note that these two cover both driver and
passenger casualties. It is in the nature of phobias that people suffering from fear of
flying are often quite content to travel by car, although it is several times riskier.
Having scanned Table 2, coming across Table 3 – taken from the latest Rail Safety
and Standards Board (RSSB) Annual Safety Performance Report – is a surprise. In
the first column of Table 3, the 0.0 rate of Table 2 for air transport has turned into a
0.1 for airlines. This is not, however, one of those school algebra paradoxes that
proves that 0 = 1. The basic idea is that comparisons need to use a long-term
average for fatality rates, ie a Synthetic Estimate. This is to take account of the fact
that accidents are rare and a typical airline accident results in many more deaths
than a typical rail accident.
RSSB advise that the airline calculation has six stages:
1. Estimate worldwide fatality rates (per flight hour) 2002-04 for jets, turbo-
props and business jets.
2. Estimate ‘unadjusted’ UK fatality rate per flight hour using proportions of
jets, turbo props and business jets in UK large aircraft fleet.
3. Adjust for UK’s better than average safety record by using Developed World
– European, North America & South West Pacific – rather than World data
4. Adjust for ongoing safety improvements
5. Convert from flight hours to passenger flight hours
6. Convert from passenger flight hours to passenger km
RSSB’s report carefully notes some of the caveats and biases involved, eg the
greater likelihood of weather and communication problems in many other countries,
the lack of high ground near UK runways, and a greater use of landing aids at UK
airports. The methodology is rational – but it is a bit strange that the calculation of
UK/GB risks never actually involves examining specifically UK or GB accident data.
Table 3’s other columns, estimating the relative safety risks using other metrics, are
also interesting. Statistical reports frequently use RPK for transport safety estimates,
but is it the best basis for a safety metric? Using hours as the denominator makes
rail appear much better than airlines. Assuming the RPK-based rates are the same,
this is simply because air travel is faster than rail travel. If the traveller’s objective is
to get from A to B, the risk of death in an accident would be the same for the two
modes, supposing very similar distances travelled.
Using an Hours-based metric produces some odd results, even when the focus is on
a single transport mode. Suppose that UK rail travel had continued to have the kinds
of speed restrictions imposed after the 2000 Hatfield accident. If these added 25% to
the time for every journey, but had no other effects, then the Fatality Risk per Hour in
Table 3 would reduce by 20%. Thus, the number of deaths a year for exactly the
same journeys would be unchanged, but the Fatality Risk per Hour would be better,
thanks simply to a slower service. At the other end of the spectrum (and apologising
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Transporter that moved people to their destination a million times faster, but without
any increase in the risk per journey, would be appalling in Fatality Risk per Hour
terms. 'Per hour' metrics do have value if the focus is on providing a safe service
over time: for example, safety performance of an air travel control organisation is
usually measured by the rate of accidents and/or incidents per 10 million hours.
Table 3’s final column shows a huge difference between airline and rail safety – the
average length of a journey generates the difference. But sensible comparisons
have to be like-for-like: there is not much value in matching the 22 minute rail journey
from Watford to Euston with a flight from Heathrow to San Francisco. For essentially
the same journey, eg London to Manchester, the most suitable comparison is
fatalities per RPK, as recognised by RSSB: ”From the user’s perspective, the risk
from using a mode of transport can be assessed on the basis of fatalities per traveller
kilometre. In theory, this allows him/her to compare the risk from undertaking the
same journey using different modes.”
So, the answer to ‘Is it Safe for Me to Fly?’ sketched here is generally positive.
Aviation safety improvements over several decades, with huge increases in traffic,
are substantial. Aviation’s achievements match or better other modes of transport.
But further safety improvements can be delivered. The question: ‘Are the people
responsible doing everything they should to make flying safe?’ will always need to be
asked. This naturally leads to the question ‘How much should be invested in
transport safety?’ – discussed in Andrew Evans’ research.
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Figure 1. World Airline Passenger Traffic (source ICAO)
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Figure 2. World Airliner Deaths by Year (source ASN)
8Figure 3. Some Key Aviation Safety Components
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9Region 2005 2006 2007
Africa 9.21 4.31 4.09
Asia Pacific 1.00 0.67 2.76
Russia & CIS 0.00 8.60 0.00
Europe 0.33 0.32 0.29
Latin America 2.59 1.80 1.61
Middle East & North Africa 3.84 0.00 1.08
North America 0.19 0.49 0.09
North Asia 0.00 0.00 0.88
World 0.76 0.65 0.75
Table 1. Regional accident rates – Hull losses per million flights, Western Jets - IATA and
non-IATA, rates > twice World figure shown in bold italic. (source IATA)
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Mode Category 1996-2005
average
Air 1
Killed 0.00
KSI 0.00
All 0.03
Rail 2
Killed 0.4
Injured 15
Bus/coach
Killed 0.3
KSI 11
All 184
Car 3
Killed 2.7
KSI 31
All 317
Motorcycle 3
Killed 111
KSI 1360
All 5176
Table 2. GB Passenger casualty rates by mode: 1996-2005. Per thousand million passenger
kilometres (source DfT)
Notes
KSI = Killed or seriously injured
All = Killed, seriously and slightly injured
1 Passenger casualties in accidents by UK registered airline aircraft in UK & foreign airspace
2 Passenger casualties involved in train accidents and accidents occurring through
movement of railway vehicles
3 Driver and passenger casualties
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Fatality risk per 109 traveller…
km hours trips
Railway 0.1 5 4
Airline 0.1 76 290
Bus/coach 0.3 6 3
Car 2.6 100 36
Cycle 32.0 380 120
Pedestrian 36.0 150 40
Motorcycle 110.0 4,300 1,900
Table 3. Synthetic Estimates of UK modal fatality risk using different metrics (source RSSB)
